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 Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (1), 2005,  1 
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
Is There Personal Identity in Economics? 
A discussion of John B. Davis The Theory of the Individual in 
Economics: Identity and Values 
 
 
 
By/Par     Stéphane Luchini et Miriam Teschl        _ 
GREQAM, IDEP,        GREQAM, France et 
CNRS, France         Robinson College, Cambridge, UK 
 
 
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
John B. Davis explores the question of what the economic individual is. He bases his 
considerations of orthodox economics on the assumption that these theories implicitly rely 
on a conception of the individual that has its origin in Locke’s idea of the self as subjective 
inwardness. Economic history then is the attempt to deal with Locke’s inherent problems 
that this view involved. If neoclassical economics still has aspects of human psychology, 
mainstream economics dropped the subjective concept of the individual out of their 
considerations. However, Davis demonstrates that even the neoclassical concept of the 
individual fails to pass the existence test of individual identity. The latter is an idea 
developed in analogy to philosophers’ concern about personal identity and examines if the 
individual can be distinguished among different individuals and if he or she can be 
reidentified as the selfsame individual through time. The failure of the theory of the 
individual in orthodox economics led Davis to develop a concept of a socially embedded 
individual in accordance with heterodox accounts of economics. He submits this conception 
to the same test of individual identity. It appears that the socially embedded individual can 
be said to hold an identity in specific circumstances.  
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RESUME 
 
John B. Davis traite, dans son livre, la question suivante: qu’est-ce que c'est l'agent 
économique. Il base l'ensemble de ses considérations sur une vision de l'économie orthodoxe 
qui fonde implicitement ses théories sur une conception de l'individu ayant ses origines dans 
le concept de Locke du "soi" vu comme une intimité subjective. Les développements de 
l'économie orthodoxe consistent ensuite en une tentative de traiter des problèmes inhérents à 
cette conception de l'individu. Si l'économie néo-classique a toujours espéré intégrer la 
psychologie humaine, l'économie contemporaine a écarté la subjectivité de ses 
considérations. Davis démontre cependant que même la conception néoclassique de 
l'individu échoue au test d'existence d'identité de l'individu. Ce test d'existence est développé 
en analogie avec les investigations des philosophes sur l'identité personnelle et s'interroge 
simultanément sur la possibilité de distinguer un individu parmi d'autres individus et de le 
ré-identifier comme un seul et même individu dans le temps. L'échec de la théorie de 
l'individu utilisée par l'économie orthodoxe à réussir un tel test d'existence conduit Davis à 
considérer l'individu comme inclu dans le social et ce, en accord avec les propositions de 
l'économie hétérodoxe. Il soumet ensuite cette conceptualisation au même test d'existence. Il 
apparaît que l'individu inclu dans le social peut être considéré comme doté d'une identité 
dans certaines circonstances. 
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If the social world is complex, our theory of individual behavior also needs to be complex. 
John B. Davis 
 
1. FRAMING THE ISSUES 
 
What is the individual, what is the nature of the individual, what can we say about the 
existence of the individual in economics? John B. Davis explores these questions, arguing 
that their common answer relies on a particular view of the individual in economics, namely 
the subjectivist view [p. 1]. It originated from Cartesian-Newtonian dualism of human 
subjectivity or inwardness, and objective nature, and even more importantly from Locke’s 
conception of the individual as a disengaged subject. Locke’s self is atomistic, disengaged 
from the world, free of any influence from opinion, custom and desire. It is autonomously 
constituted only by first-person experiences. All other things are perceived as objects outside 
one’s private world. Locke’s disengaged or subjective inwardness, however, has been 
criticised a number of times. For example Wittgenstein claimed that there is no private 
language, that is, language itself is a set of social practices, which excludes the view of a 
totally disengaged private subject. This begs the big question of what finally the self is if it 
cannot be “realistically” disengaged: is it determined by social identification or does the self 
simply not exist? This question refers to two major critiques of Locke’s assumption of the 
self respectively: the social science critique that takes the existence of a self as given but 
defines the individual through his or her membership of different social groups. And the 
postmodernist critique that regards the self as a fiction: the self, as it were, is nothing else 
than a summary of transitory images. Images occupy the surface of things, thus a subject 
consisting in images cannot have a depth or inwardness.  
Neoclassical economics appropriated, in Davis’ view, the Lockean conception of the 
individual [p. 6]. As a consequence, it had always to deal with its inherent contradiction, that 
is, the impossibility of complete disengagement. Mainstream economics solved in some 
sense this problem by eliminating any subjectivist account altogether from economic 
theorising and by establishing a purely abstract conception of the individual.  
However, if we think, as John Davis does, that “individuals are nonetheless important in 
economics” [p. 11], we should find a way to replace economic mainstream’s abstract notion 
of the individual. To get there, Davis introduces first the idea of a theory of the individual 
identity. The latter is developed in analogy to the philosophers’ questioning of personal 
identity. “[T]he basic idea that philosophers investigate in connection with the problem of 
personal identity is whether there can reasonably be said to be something unchanging about 
individuals in spite of their obviously undergoing change trough time” [p. 12.]. Indeed, it is 
again Locke himself who is considered to be one of the first philosophers to formulate a 
theory of personal identity. Self-consciousness and memory is, according to Locke, what 
makes a person and constitutes identity through time: A person is what she is and remains 
the same as long as she has a consciousness of herself in the present and of herself having 
been in the past. In economics then, we can talk about a concept of the individual, according 
to Davis, if two identity criteria or identity conditions are satisfied: first, individuals must be 
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recognised as distinct from each other in terms of that conception’s key defining respect 
(individuation criteria); second, individuals must be followed through change as unchanged 
in terms of that conception’s key defining respect (reidentification criteria) [p. 14]. 
The main part of the book is then dedicated to the submission of the concept of the economic 
individual to a sort of existence test of individual identity by checking if the concept satisfies 
these two identity criteria. This test goes along with Davis’ general interest to develop a 
more realist model of the world based on the idea of referentiality: under what conditions 
principal terms used in a theory refer to the world. He thus uses an identity condition 
approach to reference, which means that terms in a theory, such as the individual, must be 
consistent with the two identity conditions. If the term individual, as used in the theory, does 
satisfy these conditions, it is said that the term individual passes the test and makes a 
successful reference to individuals in the world [pp. 15-16].  
Davis distinguishes two alternative conceptions of the individual in economics, which he 
contributes to orthodox economics and to heterodox economics and each of them is 
dedicated one of the two parts of the book. Both conceptions of the individual will be 
subjected to the existence test, thus to the two identity conditions, to see if they account for a 
successful and realist reference or not. The main conclusions of his book will then be that 
even though orthodox economics, thus neoclassical and mainstream economics, place great 
weight on individuals who are considered to be relatively autonomous and atomistic beings, 
they fail to produce an adequate conception of the individual. Heterodox economics instead, 
even though it places less weight on individuals as such and regard them as being embedded 
in social and economic relationships, develop elements of a proper theory of the individual.  
In this paper, we will stick to Davis main distinction and dedicate section 2 to orthodox 
economics and section 3 to heterodox economics. Within section 2 we will develop Davis’ 
arguments about the atomistic individual (2.1.) and discuss the two identity existence tests: 
reidentification (2.2.) and individuation (2.3.). In section 3 we will present his ideas about 
the socially embedded individual (3.1.) and submit it to the same existence tests (3.2.). 
Section 4 concludes and gives an overall assessment of Davis’ book. 
 
2. ORTHODOX ECONOMICS 
 
 2.1  The conception of the atomistic individual 
 
Davis bases his thoughts on the idea that classical and neoclassical economics began with a 
Lockean understanding of the individual. That is an individual defined in terms of his or her 
inaccessible “private psychology”, which was then systematically rejected and replaced with 
a formalised and abstract approach that he labels mainstream economics [p. 23]. Indeed, to 
be in line with Davis’ theory means to accept the idea that Locke “laid the groundwork for 
thinking about the individual” [ibid.] and because orthodox economics appropriated [p. 6] 
Locke’s view it follows that what is true for the Lockean individual must be true for the 
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economic individual. The orthodox economic individual inherited [ibid.] Locke’s 
contradiction, i.e. the impossibility of a completely disengaged, autonomous and private 
subject, and mainstream’s abstract conceptualisations was indeed a final escape [ibid.] to 
deal with these problems by rejecting any idea of subjectivity and psychology whatsoever. 
What is left is an abstract view of an atomistic and autonomous individual. But, “this 
evolution was driven by only a vague awareness of the problematic nature of Locke’s 
subjectivist view of the individual, [and] the mainstream’s resulting abstract individual 
conception constituted a largely unintended outcome” [p. 24].  
There is thus an inherent problem with Locke’s separation of an inner, subjective world, and 
an outer, objective one. Indeed, classical economists like Adam Smith could not solve the 
problem; they could not link individuals’ internally felt tastes with externally observed 
market operations. Neoclassical economists finally achieved this breakthrough by 
developing a theory of choice behaviour that linked inner and outer world through the 
marginal utility concept: “what the individual wants [has been made] the explanation of what 
the individual does”, the subjective world explained the objective one [p. 26]. However, 
from then onwards, subjectivity has been systematically removed and objectified, as it 
seemed incompatible with a scientific worldview. But with subjectivity also disappeared the 
basis of the private and autonomous individual. Pareto, Robbins and especially Samuelson 
contributed to the dying out of human psychology in explaining individual choices. An 
axiomatic account of preferences was left, combined with an instrumental rationality of 
achieving whatever ends with the best possible means. Mainstream economists, such as 
Rabin, try now to bring back psychology into economic analysis. But, so states Davis, 
proponents of human psychology argue that what they really are doing is not about human 
psychology, but about rationality [p. 31]. Preferences continue to be given and are not 
explained within the domain of economics. Mainstream economics, thus, continues using an 
account of atomistic individuals, but on a purely formal basis, void of any reference to 
human individuals whose subjective existence has been eliminated.  
Things became even more complicated as the abstract concept of individuals was adapted to 
supraindividual entities, which made it first of all difficult to distinguish between different 
individuals. However, armed with the arguments of methodological individualism that only 
individuals exist and that society is nothing else than the sum of all individuals, economists 
attempted to base macroeconomic phenomena on microeconomic foundations, thus to 
explain aggregated behaviour in terms of individual behaviour. However, within the context 
of the General Equilibrium Theory, the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results demonstrated 
the impossibility of linking aggregate behaviour to a specific individual behaviour. In 
contrast, new classical economists introduced concepts such as the representative agent. This 
development eliminated heterogeneous real-world individuals from the analysis altogether, 
and even though its descriptive falseness has been pointed out [Kirman 1992] the concept 
continues being used. These developments showed that the methodological individualism, 
which is nothing than “a last-ditch defense” [p. 35] to save the autonomous, albeit abstract 
individual of formal mainstream economics, failed. If it could have been shown that choice 
behaviour of multi-individual entities depended on individual choice behaviour only, but not 
the reverse, then individuals would in that sense be more fundamental than those entities. 
Mainstream economists could then simply have argued that because only individuals exist, 
their abstract concepts are also, as a matter of fact, about individuals. But things did not turn 
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out not to be like that. This called into question the possibility of an autonomous being since 
“to the extent that macroeconomics requires microfoundations, so also microeconomics 
appears to require macrofoundations” [p. 37].  
Attention was then turned to game theory and the individual as a bearer of strategies. But 
game theory is about types of agents and strategic behaviour does not say anything 
specifically about human individuals. Furthermore, it “involves a hybrid atomist-holist rather 
than purely individualist type of explanation” [p. 39], which is based especially on a “holist 
common knowledge of rationality” [ibid.] assumption. But because game theory is used 
today to account for the evolution and development of cooperative behaviour as well as 
social institutions, many economists continue considering game theory to be a reinforcement 
of the atomistic and instrumentally rational conception of the individual. At a closer view 
however, this does not hold.  
Thus, according to Davis, we might not only be worried about the way how individuals are 
defined and explained in mainstream economics, we also might be worried if mainstream 
economics is about individuals at all [p. 42]. Mainstream economics is now “a 
multidimensional, pluralistic endevor made up of a variety of different and competing 
currents of thought” [p. 81], but still, Davis says, it is not about individuals. Locke gave a 
clear definition of individuals. The identity criterion is subjective inwardness and more 
specifically human psychology. By eliminating human psychology, mainstream economics 
eliminated the basis to talk about individuals. Even though the atomistic conception of the 
individual prevails in mainstream economics, it is a form of atomism founded on a formal 
basis, which has “no essential connection to human individuals” [ibid.]. Indeed, in Chapter 5 
Davis offers a very interesting interpretation of the characterisation of the abstract 
individual’s conception by arguing that “it shares much the same philosophy of mind 
underlying an important early strand of cognitive science, namely computational 
functionalism, or the view that mind is a computer and the individual a symbol processing 
system” [p. 82]. By looking at five post-war economists – Arrow, Samuelson, Friedman, 
Simon and Lucas – Davis collects several indications in order to construct a “cognitive 
science vision of mind and the individual for economics” [p. 83] which underpins the 
progressive elimination of the individual from economic thinking.  
 
2.2 Identity in neoclassical economics I: Reidentification  
 
Thus, after having shown that the individual drops out of mainstream economics, Davis goes 
back to the neoclassical conception of the individual and starts applying to it one of his two 
identity criteria, namely reidentification, to check if the neoclassical individual makes a 
successful reference to individuals in the world. This chapter constitutes one of the key 
chapters of the book, accounting for the significance and originality of his idea to link the 
philosophers’ personal identity considerations with the conception of the economic agent. 
But, fasten your seatbelt!, it is going to be a turbulent story!!! It is in this chapter that an 
analogy of the problems faced in philosophy and economics concerning the conception of 
the individual is exercised at the utmost. Locke’s identity criterion is a private human 
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psychology, the person’s own consciousness that extends from present to past experiences. 
This is also the neoclassical conception: an individual has his or her own private tastes and 
preferences. However, Locke’s conception faces the problem that the individual cannot be 
totally private and disengaged from the world; social influences will always play a role in the 
constitution of him or herself. But, if the Lockean individual faces a problem, then, by 
analogy, so must the neoclassical conception. Indeed, according to Davis, the Locke-Hume-
Butler discussion of personal identity can be translated as it is into neoclassical economics.  
Two ordinalist neoclassical conceptions of the individual will be subjected to the 
reidentification-existence-test: the pure preference view of the individual and the individual 
as represented in the Stigler-Becker [1977] time allocation model (TAM). Reidentification 
means to find the criterion by which the conceptualised individual is conventionally 
conceived to be distinguished from others and to see if the individual thus understood can be 
followed through change as being identical [p. 46]. Davis argues that this criterion in 
economics must be the individuals’ own preferences. In the standard neoclassical view, 
neither preferences nor utility functions vary; they are exogenous to the choice of the 
individuals. Other criteria could have been endowments and information. However, 
endowments and information do vary as a result of the choices the individual makes and thus 
“would prevent our identifying this individual as the same individual at a later point in time” 
[p. 49]. Indeed, unchanging preferences are, according to Davis, the economic successor of 
the Lockean tradition to see individuals distinguished and reidentified by ways of the 
unchanging “single inner mental life” [ibid.]. But whereas Locke distinguishes between past 
and present, economic individuals have timeless preferences and do not have to make any 
suggestions about the nature of memory. “With unchanging preferences, we are conscious of 
what we prefer at all times in precisely the same way” [p. 50].  
At this stage, however, we make a cautious remark that appears to be important for some 
main arguments that follow throughout the book. Davis seems to have taken a very narrow 
definition of personal identity, one based on identity as invariability. Indeed he says, “we are 
always distinct and unchanging individuals through whatever change we undergo in other 
respects (for example, in terms of the things in our possession)” [p. 50]. However, there is a 
distinction to make between a numerical (or single) identity, which emphasises the fact that 
whatever exists “is ipso facto identical with itself” through time [Ferret 1998; p. 12]; and a 
qualitative identity that refers to maximal degree of resemblance between a thing and itself 
or between several things that are numerically different [ibid.]. Certain philosophers – 
among them Hume – seem not to have made a distinction between these two different ideas 
of identity and rather thought that qualitative identity is the criterion for numerical identity. 
In relation to personal identity this suggests that a person at two different moments of time 
remains the same person, if she is qualitatively the same. This seems to be Davis’ idea when 
he argues to look out for a criterion that distinguishes people and which remains unchanged 
throughout time in order to reidentify them [p. 14]. However, the problem is that qualitative 
identity precludes any change by definition, therefore it cannot account as criterion for a 
numerical identity undergoing change through time [Ferret 1998; p. 15].  
Davis considers that the “one thing that does not change about [individuals through time] is 
their having a single inner mental life all their own” [p. 49]. Indeed, “Locke’s particular 
version of this personal identity argument combined the assumption that we can identify 
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ourselves with consciousness with the claim that we remember ourselves in our memories of 
the past” [ibid.] However, even if the act of being continuously conscious of oneself is 
considered to be the same experience through time, being conscious of oneself in the past or 
simply remembering oneself is a different experience that relates more to memory-contents 
and would thus be changing. Therefore, if we consider the unchanging part of it, the act of 
being conscious of oneself, this amounts to an experience arguably unrelated to what one is 
conscious of1. Translated into economics, this would mean that what counts as identity 
criterion is the act of preferring and not what the preferences are about. This means that 
preferences can even change, the act of preferring still remaining the same. So why would 
unchanging preferences then be the identity criterion in neoclassical ordinalist economics? If 
on the other hand, Locke’s memory criterion is much more related to specific contents, 
which of course change over time, then it is absurd to put the issue of reidentification as 
finding something unchanging throughout time. Indeed, even Davis himself shares the view 
that it is much more plausible to assume that preferences are endogenous to the economic 
process [p. 11]. This puts into question the whole approach towards identity taken in terms of 
invariability. Indeed, the interesting question about identity is much more how one remains 
the same numerical person, even though she qualitatively changes. The answer to this would 
require a dynamical concept of identity, thus an identity criterion that changes over time plus 
a process or link between two different moments of this criterion that would account for, or 
bridge the change. This whole issue puts into question indeed the analogy drawn – and the 
way it is done – between the Lockean view of the individual and the neoclassical one.  
The Lockean consciousness-memory criterion was not uncontested. Two philosophers 
especially, namely Butler and Hume, have put forward major critiques. Because the 
economic individual is the analogue of the Lockean one, these critiques do also apply to the 
pure preference view of the economic individual. Butler noticed that Locke’s conception was 
circular. An identity criterion should always be a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to 
account for an object to be what it is. Consciousness and memory should then account for 
and constitute personal identity. However, as Butler has pointed out, consciousness and 
memory presuppose identity and cannot constitute it. It is because one looks at the same 
person at two different moments of time that this individual has the same consciousness or is 
linked through memory-experiences, but not the other way around. Hume expressed a 
different sort of critique when he said that when he was entering most intimately into 
himself, he could not detect any such thing as a self or something that would refer to a self. 
Rather, the only thing he could catch was different perceptions. This went against Locke’s 
view that the acts of consciousness would refer and constitute the existence of a self. Hume 
equally argued that the self was commonly thought to be of perfect identity and simplicity. 
But again, when he was looking into himself, he could not detect any single perception that 
remained unchanging through time. Therefore, according to Hume, there is no such thing as 
a personal identity, because there is no such thing that remains unchanged through time. 
Davis interprets Hume’s critique as being an “antisubstance argument” [p.52], because 
Locke meant by a self a “spiritual substance that somehow inhered in us” [ibid.]. Hume 
                                            
1 Indeed Davis says at p. 6: “A being understood simply as consciousness must be a private being, 
both because the self as pure consciousness can only be conceived in first-person terms, and because 
consciousness, by virtue of its intentional character, must always be separate from that which 
consciousness is of” [italics in the text].  
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rather thought that when people were talking about a self, they would take as identical what 
is only a bundle of closely related impressions that succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity; they mistake the idea of a unity with the idea of a collection of things.  
What is then the Butler-Hume critique applied to the neoclassical view? Well, “Locke’s idea 
that we can be identified with something over and above our individual states of 
consciousness is basically just what is involved in saying that individuals can be identified 
with utility functions over and above their preferences” [p. 53]. Therefore, if we consider a 
bundle of discrete preferences – by analogy to Locke’s states of consciousness – to be a 
single thing, a unity “over and above that collection” [ibid.], then we can apply the Butler-
Hume critique. And indeed, it is normally assumed that preferences belong to an individual, 
that these are his own preferences. Because of this, the utility function does not simply 
represent well-ordered preferences, but represent, as it were, the unity of the individual who 
is the “owner” of the preferences. However, this invokes the idea of “an independently 
existing thing” [ibid.] and “this assumption is precisely the one that Hume thought 
insupportable” [ibid.]. Davis stands in for Hume when he says that economists mistake the 
unity of a thing or object – the individual as the owner of a set of preferences – with the idea 
of a collection of things – preferences normally ascribed to individuals [ibid.]. However, in 
reality only a collection of preferences exists and it does not refer to anything over and above 
it. The Humean critique negates individual identity in terms of preferences. Economists, 
according to Davis, could have replied to this by saying that preferences presuppose “the 
existence of a self to whom preferences belong” [p. 54]. But this would lead directly to 
Butler’s circularity critique: if preferences presuppose the individual, then preferences 
cannot constitute the individual’s identity: it would mean to assume what should be proven.  
All this to say that individuals in terms of preferences cannot be reidentified through time!!! 
One wonders if we could not have got to the same result without mobilising a Locke-Hume-
Butler account of personal identity. For example: we could simply have said that the 
economic individual, represented with his timeless preferences, cannot be followed through 
time, because there is – as it says – just no time. Hence, the economic individual is an 
extensionless point in the sense that he is not surpassing his static conception by definition. 
Therefore, he does not have an identity as required by philosophical standards. If, thus, the 
economic individual should conform to the philosophical standards, we have to find a way 
that the conception of the individual is consistent with the two identity conditions of 
individuation and reidentification. However, as we have already seen, what we mean by 
identity depends on the way we define those identity conditions or criteria. Davis 
understands identity as invariability; we would prefer identity to be seen as a dynamical 
process. However, difficulties arise if certain philosophers mobilised for the argumentation 
are interpreted in a very specific or even inaccurate way and concepts and ideas are brought 
together that are only very distant neighbours. Locke’s identity criterion, as it were, cannot 
be simply associated with the idea of finding something unchanging through time as 
suggested by Davis. This interpretation would rather refer to what Hume thought identity 
would mean and require. However, Hume notes that a self-identical thing does not exist, 
indeed everything is changing. What does exist is a bundle of perceptions. But Hume’s 
account on human nature is not only based on perceptions, that is, impressions and ideas that 
appear in our mind, but also on a principle of association between different impressions and 
ideas. Indeed, in the Abstract of his Treatise he states that the principle of association creates 
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“[…] the only links that bind the parts of the universe together, or connect us with any 
person or object exterior to ourselves” [Hume 2000; Abstract 35]. Thus, whereas we have an 
association between the different perceptions, we do not have any such link between the 
different preferences in economics. A “collection of preferences” [p. 54] cannot be said to be 
analogous to a bundle or collection of perceptions. Bringing these concepts together and 
suggesting in that sense that the neoclassical account of the economic individual is 
“Humean” could indeed be seen as the beginning of a wrong understanding, which does no 
good, neither to Hume nor to neoclassical economics.  
But let us turn now to Stigler and Becker’s [1977] time allocation model (TAM). According 
to Davis, the TAM satisfies the Humean requirement of finding something unchanging in the 
individual through time and thus solves the Lockean individual. The individual is, in that 
account, a combination of unchanging preferences – identical for everybody – and “self 
embodied human capital stocks” [p. 56]. Being a producer and consumer at the same time, 
the individual uses market commodities, time and accumulated capital stocks to produce 
desired final goods. Investment decisions today, initiated by the individual himself, will 
affect the accumulated human capital stock tomorrow. Thus, we do have an “unarticulated 
and undefined principle of action in the idea of carrying out a campaign of human capital 
investments” [p. 57] that will be embodied in and made inseparable from the individual. 
Here, according to Davis, we certainly have “the idea of something subsistent” [ibid.].  
But this model does not completely solve the Lockean view of individuals as a disengaged 
self. Problems arise especially as to the fact that individuals’ ability as well as preferences 
are socially influenced. Human capital investments “heighten” [p. 58] so to say individuals’ 
preferences for a specific human capital. But individuals become educated and learn from 
others about how to value a certain human capital. Therefore, “we cannot reidentify the 
individual simply as a hybrid structure of preferences and embodied endowments through 
change when other individuals’ values are incorporated in the individuals’ heightened 
preferences” [p. 59]. The disengaged Lockean self does not exist. The individual before the 
human capital investment is not anymore exactly the same as after the human capital 
investment because “something other than just the individual’s own preferences goes into the 
subsequent make-up of the individual” [p. 62]. That is, “the individual is transformed in 
nature by human capital investment, and accordingly ceases to be distinguishable merely as a 
collection of preferences” [p. 156]. Even the TAM account of the individual fails to 
reidentify the individual through time. The individual is in reality nothing else than “a bundle 
or collection of different perceptions” [p. 59] 
Once again, the conclusion of this analysis depends on the link between the neoclassical and 
the Lockean view of individuals as autonomous, and atomistic, disengaged beings. If we did 
not start with this link in the first place, we might have different results. In Davis’ account 
there are consistently three interconnected ideas at work: first, that the neoclassical 
conception of the individual appropriated [p. 6] Locke’s view of the individual as a 
subjective inwardness or disengaged self. Second, economics therefore inherited [ibid.] 
Locke’s contradiction, that is, the impossibility indeed of the existence of a self, disengaged 
from the world and social influences. And third, the economic conception of the individual 
should be subjected to the two identity conditions in order to find out if it successfully refers 
to individuals in the world, as Davis would say [p. 15]; or in order to find out if it satisfies 
Is There Personal Identity in Economics? 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (1) 2005, 
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
11 
philosophical standards of identity discussions as we would prefer to call it. This last point is 
interesting in itself and attention could be paid on it in particular. Then, a distinction could 
be drawn between two different concepts of identity: what the individual is and who the 
individual is [Kirman and Teschl 2004]. The latter refers to the idea of a dynamical concept 
of identity, initiated by a self-reflexive and conscious individual who remains numerically 
the same through time. The former refers globally to the common way in economics to 
represent individuals in terms of preferences and constraints. Some models include time 
aspects (such as Stigler and Becker [1977]), others not. Of course, in static models, nothing 
much can really be said about identity through time. However, the what conception of the 
individual, refers to several quite common characteristics in economic models: first, change 
is brought about from outside, that is, the individual is only reacting to modifications in the 
constraints. Second and related to the first, no conscious behaviour initiated by the individual 
can affect his or her constraints. And third, more information can be added that is related to 
the individual, but this amounts to giving him or her a richer social identity or identification, 
but not a better account of his or her dynamical development as a person through time. Given 
this general characteristics, Stigler and Becker’s paper is classified as a what conception of 
individuals. The “principle of action” [p. 57] is still a principle of reaction to changes in the 
individual’s constraints in accordance with the first characteristic. Stigler and Becker’s 
model is first of all a model of human capital stock accumulation that, evaluated at market 
prices, initiates new investment and thus influences the decisions at a later date. Preferences 
remain the same, what is changing are the constraints and the accumulated stock of human 
capital, which is not “embodied” in the individual, but which remains a good like any other 
that is possessed by the individual. The individual can only be followed through time by his 
or her changing stocks of human capital. Rather than to see this model as a Lockean, 
subjectivist account of individuals, it gives an account of what the individual is, because all 
that matters are the constraints and not the preferences of the individual as such. 
Furthermore, changes in the behaviour of the individual can only be explained in terms of 
price and income changes, but not because of a conscious and self-reflexive initiative taken 
by the individual irrespective of prices and incomes.  
 
2.3 Identity in neoclassical economics II: Individuation 
 
We are left with the idea that individuals are nothing than a bundle of different 
“perceptions”. According to Davis, we must show that this bundle however has a unity; 
otherwise individuals could not be distinguished as independent and separate beings [p. 62]. 
Economists always took the individual for granted and thus that individuals are 
distinguishable from each other. Davis granted “the theory the benefit of the doubt on this 
score” [p. 46] and looked at the second identity condition, namely reidentification, first. 
However, the conclusions we can draw from Davis’ analysis throws doubt on the assumption 
of independently existing individuals. He therefore turns then to the first identity condition, 
namely individuation.  
The idea of individuals with different well-ordered preferences having a unity, thus being 
representable by a single utility function comes from the assumption that the individuals’ 
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different preferences are commensurable and thus comparable to each other. However, if 
preferences are noncomparable, then we have to consider the individual to be a set of 
preferences or to have several utility functions, which leads to the idea of the individual as a 
multiple self or having multiple selves. Several economists took this way and proposed 
models that base the conception of the individual on some sort of multiple self: principle-
agent views of the unity of the individual; weakness of will and self-control models; and 
finally the accounts on metapreferences and hierarchical organisations of preferences. The 
principle-agent view compares the individual to a firm, where different specialised 
individuals work to achieve a common enterprise. However, there is an element of 
circularity: “if firms are treated as single agents by analogy to individuals, then one cannot 
say that the firm as a single agent is a model for the unity of the individual” [p. 70]. 
Furthermore, different individuals are supposed to work together because of their mutual 
advantage, but it is hard to argue, according to Davis, that human psychology is equally 
simple [p. 71]. Weakness of will models seek to explain why an individual, even though 
desiring one thing more than another, chooses the less desired of the two. Some applications 
of these models try to understand the behaviour of shortsighted individuals who favour the 
present over the future. Individuals who do not exhibit weakness of will are explained in 
terms of their shortsighted selves in control of their future selves. These people are supposed 
to develop for example some precommitment strategies to bind themselves to their original 
plans. One of these strategies may be a deliberately sought control of others over one’s own 
commitment. Thus, in this and other examples of weaknesses of will models, non-
preference-based principles are introduced that raise the question of the individual’s 
constitution within a social context. The metapreference approach offers an interesting way 
to deal with multiple selves by trying to coordinate an individual’s different sets of rankings. 
However, multiple-selves-individual-choice can be compared to the multiple-individual-
social-choice problems and it turns out that a single ranking is only a special case of the 
problem’s solution. Another issue that can be related to the idea of multiple selves, is 
endogenously changing preferences: taste determine choice, and choice will reverberate back 
on taste. We either can have an intentional change when an individual tries purposely to 
change his or her preferences according to some metapreferences, or imagine a causal 
process of adaptation that takes place unconsciously. However, “in the changing individual 
preference framework it is difficult to distinguish the case of the changed individual from the 
case of different individuals” [p. 78]. Nothing in the preference orderings themselves 
indicate if they belong to one single individual or if they belong to several ones. All these 
considerations show that economists ordinarily assume the individual to exist and to be a 
unity, but they are unable to say how unity is represented in their models. But if we cannot 
recognise the unity of individuals, we are not able to distinguish and individuate them.  
Orthodox economics’ interest is primarily about individuals. However, according to Davis’ 
considerations, the neoclassical approach fails to individuate and to reidentify the individual 
through time and change and mainstream economics is left with an abstract concept of the 
individual that has lost every aspect of subjectivity, Locke’s basis to talk about individuals. 
Therefore, orthodox economics’ conviction to be about individuals “is not well supported” 
[p. 80]. To solve this problem, Davis turns to heterodox economics and their considerations 
of the economic individual. One common trait of heterodox economists is that they turned 
away from the Lockean conception of the individual and consider a human being who is 
Is There Personal Identity in Economics? 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 3 (1) 2005, 
http://ethique-economique.org/ 
13 
socially embedded. Davis turns therefore in the second part of his book to the 
characterisation of a socially embedded individual and investigates if this concept can 
properly be individuated and reidentified through time.  
 
3. HETERODOX ECONOMICS 
 
3.1 The socially embedded individual  
 
The conception of the socially embedded individual relies on structure-agency models of 
individuals and society that evolved as a response to the two main competing traditions of 
social thinking, namely methodological individualism and methodological holism. The basic 
idea of these structure-agency models is to see the individual as socially embedded, thus 
being acted upon by social structures; and as an agent who influences and changes society. 
However, as structure-agency theorists simply assumed agency and therefore paid little 
attention to a full account of this concept, Davis couples it with considerations on self-
reflexivity stemming from socio-psychological research. More specifically, he explores the 
literature on individuals’ development of a self-concept when engaging in self-referent 
behaviour. This is a class of behaviour where individuals take themselves as objects. That is, 
individuals examine their behaviour and “in forming judgements about it, create and recreate 
their self-conceptions” [p. 114]. This structure of reflexivity is then incorporated into the 
structure-agency models: Individuals examine the socially imposed views of themselves and 
eventually modify these views by judging and evaluating them. This is a general framework, 
used in different heterodox economic accounts such as institutionalism, social economics, 
critical realism, feminism and others.  
Davis himself considers a very specific account of socially embedded individuals namely 
collective intentionality analysis2. This analysis does not consider the relationships between 
socially embedded individuals. It rather sees social relationships as embedded in individuals. 
“The basic idea is that, while only individuals form intentions, alongside those intentions 
expressed from a first-person singular point of view, individuals also express shared or 
collective intentions from a first-person plural point of view” [p. 130]. Thus, when 
individuals express intentions in first-person plural terms, they link themselves automatically 
to all other individuals that express the same intentions. Of course, the individual continues 
to have her first-person singular intentions and this continues to account for her autonomy. 
But in addition to that, there exist first-person plural intentions that explain social 
embeddedness. Davis thus explores a particular context in which these first-person plural 
intention arises: social groups. Within a well-defined context of social groups, first-person 
plural intentions are more correctly expressed than in more loosely organised social settings. 
Individuals engage in repeated interaction within these groups that are recognised as groups 
by all participating members. So a first-person plural or “we”-intention is “an individual’s 
                                            
2 Based on Tuomela [1991, 1995] 
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attribution of an intention to the members of a group to which the individual belongs, based 
on that individual both having that we-intention and also believing that it is held by other 
individuals in the same group” [p. 134]. Shared intentions are a matter of reciprocal attitudes 
and not of shared attitudes [ibid.]. Members of groups share certain rules and norms. “Rules 
are the product of an explicit or implicit agreement brought about by some authority, and 
used to determine a distribution of tasks and activities to individuals. […] In contrast, in the 
case of norms a network of mutual beliefs substitutes for actual agreements between 
individuals in determining distributions of tasks and activities across individuals” [p. 135]. 
Rules and norms constitute reasons for action by those who accept them. Violating rules 
would involve sanctions against the individual who does not observe them; violating norms 
would cause disapproval on the part of the others. Rules are thus said to constitute the basis 
for institutions, norms for social values. In both cases, we-intentions are the key to 
understand group action. Individuals, then, occupy certain positions within groups to which 
are attributed tasks as well as rights. And the individual holds a certain social position across 
groups that are equally understood in terms of certain task-right pairs.  
How does this collective intentionality then fit into the structure-agency framework where 
the main idea is the interaction between social structure and the agent? Well, individuals 
commit themselves to observe the rules and norms of the group. However, these rules and 
norms as well as tasks and rights constitute the social structure that influence and limit the 
individual’s behaviour. “Thus, in spite of shared intentions being fully individual intentions 
and therefore voluntary in nature, individuals having shared intentions occasions them being 
influenced by the social structure of those groups in which those intentions are expressed” 
[p. 137]. On the other hand, because we-intentions are “sets of continually converging and 
reconverging individual attitudes that may exhibit both stability and instability” [ibid.], the 
individuals’ forming these shared intentions also influence the social structure. Finally, what 
about reflexive behaviour that should be linked to the structure-agency framework to account 
for a better understanding of agency? Reflexivity arises especially when individuals notice 
that they expressed wrong we-intentions, that is, an intention rejected by the others of the 
group. This needs a form of evaluation of all members of the group of why their views differ 
and this initiates reflexive behaviour.  
 
3.2 Identity of the socially embedded individual:  
Individuation and reidentification  
 
This view, thus, constitutes Davis’ account of the socially embedded individual who replaces 
the Lockean conception of the individual. We now have to submit this conception to the 
same identity criteria as we did with the Lockean individual before. Here, Davis starts with 
the individuation criterion, that is the question of what allows individuals to be distinguished 
from each other. Indeed, individuation seems to be the more difficult identity condition in 
the social embeddedness context as individuals are explained in terms of their social 
characteristics [p. 143]. Therefore the challenge is to explain individuals who are related to 
one another but still distinct beings.  
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One cannot individuate the individual through the position she has within and across social 
groups. Different individuals may occupy the same position or one individual may hold 
several positions at once. The question therefore rather is how individuals “come to occupy 
different positions” [p. 144. Italics in the text], thus looking for individual characteristics that 
explain how individuals and positions are matched. These characteristics could of course be 
differences in ability and experience. However, the still unresolved question is how one 
recognises the difference between acquired and natural abilities. Therefore, ability cannot 
account for individuation of individuals. But how individuals come to occupy their position 
is also a question of their intentions, which are individual characteristics by definition. It 
remains the fact that we added shared intentions to individual intentions which are social in 
nature and require others in the individual’s use of “we” language. So how can individuals 
then be distinguished from one another in collective intentionality terms? Well, “when 
individuals use “we” language, they bind themselves to whatever that language implies, but 
they do so intentionally” [p. 145]. That is, individuals bind themselves voluntarily to rules 
and norms and accept willingly tasks and rights. Stated differently, they ““self-impose” upon 
themselves whatever those shared intentions imply” [ibid.]. Thus, we can individuate 
individuals because they can impose on themselves specific tasks and rights. “What is 
important about this capacity in the current context is that only individuals can self-impose 
upon themselves” [p. 146]. Any other social entity cannot self-impose on individuals.  
Davis’ account on the socially embedded individual is an extremely interesting and finely 
elaborated combination of theories. However, we cannot help but asking the question: who 
or what is this self on whom the individual imposes? We cannot find any answer in his text. 
What the self is on which individuals impose is not explained. Indeed it seems that the 
individual’s capacity to self-impose, which serves as basis for distinguishing between 
people, can only do this, because distinct individuals are already presupposed. It is the self 
that exists on which self-imposition is done by individuals thus individuated. In that sense, 
Davis does what orthodox economists do, he assumes different individuals to exist. Davis 
would probably reply that embedded individuals are only contingently distinct from each 
other, and not necessarily so like atomistic individuals with their private, subjective 
inwardness [p. 148]. Therefore, individuals cannot be said to exist before they are 
distinguished. The difference between contingently and necessarily distinct is that the former 
depends on the individuals’ capacity to self-impose. When people do not exercise this 
capacity, they cannot be distinguished. But this leaves open the question at what point we 
can say that individuals have the capacity to self-impose and when they don’t. It might be 
claimed, for instance, that finally, every individual is self-imposing on him or herself the 
action he or she is doing – even the child that is told off by his parents to tidy up his room 
and does this only reluctantly. If he did not self-impose this action, the family would still 
have a row. Also, the question arises what this capacity actually is? At a later point, Davis 
states that capacity “is the idea of a power that may or may not be exercised” [p. 158]. But 
where is this power coming from? Does capacity to do something not eventually imply a self 
that “has the power to set aside the influences that opinion, custom, and desire can have upon 
us” [p. 3], a self that has an “empowered disengagement from the world” [p. 5], free to self-
impose voluntarily different group memberships? Thus, is there, and if yes, where, a 
difference to the Lockean self? Is it different because, as Davis suggests, this capacity to 
self-impose can be an object of social policy: “Institutions can evolve and be designed either 
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to impede or to promote individuals’ exercise of this capacity” [p. 148]. Yet, if it is the case 
that social policy has influences on the self, or rather on the individuals’ capacity to self-
impose, then what makes self-imposition as an individuation criterion different from, say, 
ability, in relation to which Davis argues that it is hard to discriminate between natural and 
acquired abilities and therefore cannot serve to distinguish people. Where can we draw the 
distinction between the “natural” capacity to self-impose and the capacity that was socially 
enhanced? We are going round a circle: self-imposition requires an individual who has the 
capacity to self-impose, but this capacity can be influenced by social policies. Thus it is the 
society that makes the individual who self-imposes on himself and can thus be distinguished 
as individual. But capacity to self-impose really means that there is an individual who 
voluntarily does this self-imposition, who has self-reflexively evaluated social influences and 
is thus free of social constrains to do a specific action. The individual, thus, is escaping or 
maybe even refuting the society that helps him to exist and to be distinguished from other 
people. 
 
This raises a second point: why should individuals self-impose something? What is the 
motivation behind it? Indeed, it seems that the collective intentionality framework, at least as 
Davis presented it, only considers individuals who already participate in groups. In that case, 
collective intentionality can explain many phenomena because people already accepted or 
self-imposed upon themselves specific rules and norms, tasks and rights and behave self-
reflexively in accordance with them. But what about formation of groups, and what about an 
individual who wants to become a member of a group? Why should he want to do this? His 
intentions alone do not give any answer. A preference account could give some answer, at 
least in terms of motivation. But if we top up the collective intentionality with a preference 
account, when do we know what explanation we should use for what situation?  
It seems as if there are still many questions to be asked and to be explored in order to be sure 
that collective intentionality can replace or substitute and to what extent orthodox economics 
considerations on similar questions.  
However, suppose now that we can successfully distinguish individuals. What remains to be 
shown is if we can reidentify individuals thus distinguished and understood through time.  
Indeed, in the context of the socially embedded individual, reidentification is the question 
“whether individuals distinguished from one another in terms of their capacity to impose 
responsibilities upon themselves can be reidentified across change in group membership” [p. 
155]. In the previous neoclassical model, only Stigler and Becker’s time-allocation-model 
would consider an individual through time. However, in this account the individual changed, 
as it were, his nature as he would not be reidentifiable in terms of his own preferences only. 
Social influences modify the individual’s preferences in the process of his human capital 
investment. Change of group associations in the socially embedded individual conception 
implies a continuous change of rules and norms as well as task and rights combination. Is the 
individual going to be transformed in nature by these changes? The essential point of this 
question is to consider to what extent individuals keep their reflexive capacity to self-impose 
social group requirements and to what extent they would be “overwhelmed by an 
increasingly dense social world” [p. 157] which makes them to become passive recipients 
and followers of social requirements. The answer to this is to consider the individual who 
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has the capacity to self-impose in the context of Amartya Sen’s capability approach. 
Capacity “is the idea of a power that may or may not be exercised”, whereas a capability “is 
the idea of a power that has been developed and cultivated so as to be susceptible to regular 
exercise” [p. 158]. Indeed, Sen’s capability approach is a way to evaluate individuals’ 
advantage in terms of functionings – their different beings and doings, and in terms of 
capabilities – the real freedom individuals have to be and to do different things [p. 154]. In 
this approach, reidentification of individuals is possible on the basis of an individual who has 
developed a capability of freely participating and moving from and to different social 
groups. If an individual possesses this capability, it means that he has learned “how to 
consistently exercise the individuating capacity that people inherently possess to freely 
impose social group participation upon themselves” [p. 158]. The freedom aspect of the 
capability is of major importance for the reidentification condition of individuals’ identity. 
Indeed, sometimes, according to Davis, capabilities are also seen as realised functionings 
only, that is, what the person is actually able to be and to do [p. 159]. This view of 
capabilities is then rather similar to the human capital investment approach. But if there were 
no possibility of choice, then individuals would not be able to use their capacity to freely 
self-impose group participation and thus could not be distinguished and reidentified though 
time.  
So does the socially embedded individual framework pass or fail the reidentification test? To 
give “a fair reponse” as Davis calls it [p. 159], it does not seem that many people in the 
world today have developed the capability to freely self-impose their group affiliations. 
“Most people today see group associations as “structures of constraint”, and find themselves 
unable freely to move between and negotiate their multiple social responsibilities” [ibid.]. 
Thus, no, the socially embedded individual conception does not pass the test of 
reidentification. However, the nature of the failure, so to say, is different from the Lockean 
subjectivist view of individuals. There, as was said, individuals change their nature through 
time. That means that the conception of the individual in subjective, private terms fails. The 
embedded view of the individual does not fail because of its conception, but “because of the 
way the world happens to be organised” [p. 160].  
However, this means that if we would not look at the way the world happens to be, the 
socially embedded individual could be theoretically reidentified through change. Therefore, 
this conception would pass the existence test, i.e. would pass the two identity conditions 
according to which we have a means to say if a term, such as individual, successfully refers 
to the world. Hence, if we do not look at the world before our conclusion if the term passes 
or not the existence test, we would be able to say that yes, the socially embedded individual 
does successfully refer to the world. But this is a contradiction with what Davis just stated, 
namely, that most individuals are not freely imposing group associations on themselves. The 
solution to this is that on the one hand, Davis argues that the socially embedded individual is 
an ideal conception that tells us how individuals could be distinguished and reidentified [p. 
160]. On the other hand, even if a certain concept passes the existence test, it does not 
guarantee that it “actually picks out things “out there”” [p. 16]. It finally seems that the idea 
of an ideal conception, that is, a conception based on certain values, thus contrary to models 
that simply describe the world, is more important than Davis’ original concern about 
realisticness. However, ideal conceptions influence the real world: policies that are based on 
some ideal conception tend to influence the world in accordance with its values. And if these 
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policies have a certain success, the world is going to be like the ideal conception intended it 
to have [p. 161]. Thus, the embedded individual could slowly evolve from an ideal 
conception to a real-world description.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
John B. Davis participates with this book in a general movement and interest among 
economists to render economics more real and to look over and above standard economic 
theorising in order to include more sociological, psychological or socio-psychological 
concerns. His major contribution to that is to put the ontological discussion of the economic 
individual on the forefront of these interests and to link philosophical issues about identity 
with the economic conception of individuals. Indeed, Davis’ main motivation in writing this 
book is, it seems, his claim and intuition that the way individuals are represented in a theory 
will affect the world. In the second part of his book, he presents his own vision of individuals 
as socially embedded and it becomes clear: the major issue is the individuals’ capacity to 
self-impose. Consequences follow immediately for social policy making if this view of 
individuals is accepted. In the first part of his book, he shows that not knowing which 
conception of the individual orthodox economics actually relies upon led systematically to 
the extinction of the individual and his replacement with objective accounts and cognitive 
science explanation of his subjective beings and doings. Individuals are becoming computers 
and social policies are then made for computers instead for individuals.  
However, Davis’ gloomy description of the evolution of orthodox economics does not seem 
to hold if we take a larger definition of mainstream economics than he does. If mainstream 
economics is not simply those currents of thought with “a purely formalist conception” [p. 
23] of the individual and “a set of ad hoc claims about individual behavior” instead of “a 
theory about the nature of individuals”, but take mainstream as what is currently published in 
major journals, then we notice that there is a huge interest even among orthodox economists 
in developing microeconomic theories on more realistic grounds. Social psychology 
especially is looked up by economists3 because this area is, as Jean Tirole states “[…] 
untrodden for economists and seems extremely promising. Topics include status 
relationships, envy, and community identity and relationships, but the reader will easily 
figure out several others” [Tirole, 2002]. Social interaction and heterogeneous agents are 
given a major role in the explanation of price formation as well as in econometric models4. 
Even social identity, social capital and status consideration entered the tribune of 
economics5. The question therefore to be asked is: Is the individual coming back into 
orthodox economics? And is he or she coming back as an embedded individual? Does this or 
these new representation(s) of the economic individual pass the test of individuation and 
                                            
3 See for example papers by Bénabou and Tirole [2002, 2003] 
4 See for example Weisbuch, Kirman and Heireiner [2000]; Brock and Durlauf [2001] 
5 See for example Akerlof and Kranton [2000; 2002], Becker and Murphy [2000] and Bernheim 
[1994].  
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reidentification? And if yes, in what sense are they different to Davis’ own view of the 
individual? These issues are regretfully unexplored by Davis.  
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